Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-262) and index.

Cover
Perceptual Experience
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Figures
Epigraph
1: Representationalism
I. Introduction
II. Goals
III. Fixing Ideas about Perception and Experience
IV. Teleosemantics Plus Representational Pluralism
V. Selectionist Teleosemantics, Learning, and Cummins Teleosemantics
VI. Two Objections to the Foregoing Picture
VII. Conclusion
2: Appearance and Reality I
I. Introduction
II. Introspective Grounds for Perceptual Relativity
III. Experimental Grounds for Relativity IV. Appearance Properties
V. Thouless Sizes
VI. More on Thouless Properties
VII. Objective Properties
VIII. Conclusion
3: Appearance and Reality II
I. Introduction
II. Alternative Accounts of Visual Appearances
III. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Peripheral Sense Organs
IV. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Attention
V. Thouless Properties and Causal Theories of Representation
VI. Generalizing from Vision to Other Perceptual Modalities
VII. Appearance and Reality in Audition
VIII. Appearance and Reality in Touch IX. Appearance and Reality in Olfaction
X. Conclusion
4: Perceptual Awareness of Particulars
I. Introduction
II. Particularism vs Existentialism
III. An Argument for Existentialism
IV. Arguments for Particularism
V. Awareness of Particulars
VI. The Nature of Objects of Perceptual Awareness
VII. A Dual Systems Account of Object Awareness
VIII. A Unified Account of Object Awareness
IX. Awareness of Objects Qua Members of Kinds
X. Conclusion
5: Perceptual Phenomenology
I. Introduction
II. Dualism
III. Phenomenal Representationalism IV. Reasons for Representationalist Accounts of Awareness
V. An Objection to Phenomenal Representationalism
VI. Conclusion
APPENDIX I: The Phenomenology of Conscious Thought
APPENDIX II: The Phenomenology of Moods and Emotions
6: A Quasi-Perceptualist Account of Pain Experience
I. Introduction
II. Fixing Ideas
III. The Damage Detection System and Its Relation to Pain
IV. Six Concerns about This Theory of Pain
V. Hurting
VI. Awareness of Pain and Perceptual Awareness
VII. Conclusion
7: Perceptual Consciousness
I. Introduction
II. The Autonomy Thesis III. A Metaphysical Argument for the Autonomy Thesis
IV. A Fourth Argument for Autonomy
V. The Categorical Base Hypothesis
VI. Phenomenal Consciousness
VII. Proposals about P-Consciousness
VIII. The Second-OrderTheory of P-Consciousness
IX. The Adverbial Theory of P-Consciousness
X. The Categorical Base Theory of P-Consciousness
XI. Conclusion
8: Percepts and Concepts
I. Introduction
II. A Theory of Propositional Attitudes
III. Percepts are Metaphysically Independent of Concepts