000			03761cam a2200313 i 4500
001			22479536
005			20240516202530.0
008			220325s2022 enk b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2022935538
020			_a9780192867766
020			_a9780191959868
035			_a(OCoLC)on1338666316
040			_aUKMGB _beng _cUKMGB _erda _dOCLCF _dUIU _dDLC
042			_alccopycat
100	1		_aHill, Christopher S., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aPerceptual experience [electronic resource] / _cChristopher S. Hill.
260			_aOxford, United States ; _aNew York, NY : _bOxford University Press, _cc2022.
300			_axii, 289 pages ;
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 245-262) and index.
505	0		_aCover Perceptual Experience Copyright Dedication Contents Preface Acknowledgments List of Figures Epigraph 1: Representationalism I. Introduction II. Goals III. Fixing Ideas about Perception and Experience IV. Teleosemantics Plus Representational Pluralism V. Selectionist Teleosemantics, Learning, and Cummins Teleosemantics VI. Two Objections to the Foregoing Picture VII. Conclusion 2: Appearance and Reality I I. Introduction II. Introspective Grounds for Perceptual Relativity III. Experimental Grounds for Relativity IV. Appearance Properties V. Thouless Sizes VI. More on Thouless Properties VII. Objective Properties VIII. Conclusion 3: Appearance and Reality II I. Introduction II. Alternative Accounts of Visual Appearances III. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Peripheral Sense Organs IV. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Attention V. Thouless Properties and Causal Theories of Representation VI. Generalizing from Vision to Other Perceptual Modalities VII. Appearance and Reality in Audition VIII. Appearance and Reality in Touch IX. Appearance and Reality in Olfaction X. Conclusion 4: Perceptual Awareness of Particulars I. Introduction II. Particularism vs Existentialism III. An Argument for Existentialism IV. Arguments for Particularism V. Awareness of Particulars VI. The Nature of Objects of Perceptual Awareness VII. A Dual Systems Account of Object Awareness VIII. A Unified Account of Object Awareness IX. Awareness of Objects Qua Members of Kinds X. Conclusion 5: Perceptual Phenomenology I. Introduction II. Dualism III. Phenomenal Representationalism IV. Reasons for Representationalist Accounts of Awareness V. An Objection to Phenomenal Representationalism VI. Conclusion APPENDIX I: The Phenomenology of Conscious Thought APPENDIX II: The Phenomenology of Moods and Emotions 6: A Quasi-Perceptualist Account of Pain Experience I. Introduction II. Fixing Ideas III. The Damage Detection System and Its Relation to Pain IV. Six Concerns about This Theory of Pain V. Hurting VI. Awareness of Pain and Perceptual Awareness VII. Conclusion 7: Perceptual Consciousness I. Introduction II. The Autonomy Thesis III. A Metaphysical Argument for the Autonomy Thesis IV. A Fourth Argument for Autonomy V. The Categorical Base Hypothesis VI. Phenomenal Consciousness VII. Proposals about P-Consciousness VIII. The Second-OrderTheory of P-Consciousness IX. The Adverbial Theory of P-Consciousness X. The Categorical Base Theory of P-Consciousness XI. Conclusion 8: Percepts and Concepts I. Introduction II. A Theory of Propositional Attitudes III. Percepts are Metaphysically Independent of Concepts
650		0	_aPerception (Philosophy)
650		0	_aExperience.
655			_aElectronic books
856			_uhttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1sTYooYzGANF32cURMBZsOvM_aYKrcud5/view?usp=drive_link
942			_2lcc _cEBK
999			_c52819 _d52819